How to make RSA and some other encryptions probabilistic by Roman'kov, Vitalii
ar
X
iv
:1
60
3.
02
03
1v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  7
 M
ar 
20
16
HOW TO MAKE RSA AND SOME OTHER ENCRYPTIONS
PROBABILISTIC
VITALI˘I ROMAN’KOV
Abstract. A new scheme of probabilistic subgroup-related encryption
is introduced. Some applications of this scheme based on the RSA,
Diffie-Hellman and ElGamal encryption algorithms are described. Se-
curity assumptions and main advantages of this scheme are discussed.
We outline that this scheme is potentially semantically secure under
reasonable cryptographic assumptions.
1. Some algorithmic problems for finite fields and modular
rings.
In [1], [2], we proposed a novel probabilistic public-key encryption, based
on the RSA cryptosystem. Its security is based on intractability of the
membership and exponent problems for modular rings and usual security
assumptions for the RSA encryption (see exact definitions and explanations
below). Also these problems can be considered for finite fields. There are
many reasons to estimate these two problems as hard mathematical prob-
lems. We note in this connection that the well-known Quadratic residuosity
problem is a partial case of the membership problem.
1.1. The membership, order and exponent problems for finite fields
and modular rings. We consider multiplicative groups of finite fields and
modular rings, specified by a list of generators, or by some other effective
way. The two most basic questions about such groups are membership in
and the order of the group. It is not known how to answer these questions
without solving hard number theoretic problems (factoring and discrete log).
Let n be a product of two different primes p and q. Let Zn be the cor-
responding modular ring. Let Qn be the subgroup of Gn = Z
∗
n consisting
of all quadratic residues. The following problem is one of the most known
decision problems in number theory and cryptography.
The Quadratic residuosity problem (QRP). Given an element f ∈
Gn, determine if f ∈ Qn.
We assume that this determination should be effective. This problem
is considered by many authors as intractable. A number of cryptographic
schemes are based on this intractability, and the famous Goldwasser-Micali
cryptosystem is one of them. It is important to note that the semantic
security property of the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem is based on the
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intractability of the QRP. The QRP is a particular case of the following
decision problem.
The Membership Problem (MPH). Let G be a group, and H be a
subgroup of G. Given an element f ∈ G, determine if f ∈ H.
It seems that the following problem was previously considered only for
matrix groups.
The order problem (OP). Given an element g (subgroupH) of a group
G, determine order |g| (|H|).
Lemma 1. Let p and q be two different odd primes such that p, q ≡
3(mod 4), and n = pq. Then solvability of OP forGn = Z
∗
n implies solvability
of QRP for Gn.
Proof. Let p = 4k + 3 and q = 4l + 3. Then |Gn| = (p − 1)(q − 1) =
4(2k + 1)(2l + 1). As index of Qn in Gn is 4, then Qn has odd order
m = (2k+1)(2l+1). An element g lies in Qn if and only if |g| is odd. Hence,
if we can determine |g| for each g ∈ Gn, we can solve QRP for Gn.
Let Fq, q = p
r, be the finite field of order q and characteristic p. If the pri-
mality decomposition of q−1 is known then there is a polynomial algorithm
solving OP for elements of F∗q (see [3]).
The exponent problem (EP). Given a subgroup H of a group G,
determine exponent e(H), i.e., the minimal positive integer e such that
he = 1 for every element h ∈ H.
Obviously, the solvability EP implies solvability OP, and by Lemma 1
solvability QRP in the case p, q ≡ 3(mod 4).
1.2. Constructing finite fields and modular rings that contain sub-
groups of prescribed exponent. Let r be a positive integer, and one
party, say Bob, wants to construct a field F of a sufficiently large size that
contains an element g ∈ F∗ such that |g| = r. Then he seeks to find a prime
p in the form p = 1 + 2rx where x is taken randomly. He checks the pri-
mality of p with some of the known primality tests. When it turns out p
is prime, there is an element g ∈ F∗p such that |g| = r. It can be found by
ordinary effective procedure (see [3]). As r divides pk − 1 for any k, he can
take field Fq for q = p
k for suitable k, and to find element g ∈ F∗q such that
|g| = r. If he wants to get a couple g1, ..., gt of elements such that |gi| = ri,
for prescribed positive integers ri (i = 1, ..., t) he seeks to find a prime p in
the form p = 1+2rx, where r =
∏t
i=1 ri, and x is taken randomly. Then he
gets desired elements g1, ..., gt of a field Fq, q = p
k for a suitable k as above.
Let e be a positive integer, and Bob wants to construct a field F of a suf-
ficiently large size such that the multiplicative group F∗ contains subgroup
H of exponent e. Then he generates a couple of positive integers r1, ..., rt
such that lcm(r1, ..., rk) = e, then constructs a field Fq, q = p
k, for a suitable
k, and finds elements g1, ..., gt ∈ F
∗
q such that |gi| = ri for i = 1, ..., t, as
explained above, and then succeeds in determining H = gp(g1, ..., gt).
Let r be a positive integer, and Bob wants to construct a modular ring
Zn of a sufficiently large size n = pq, where p and q are two different odd
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prime numbers, that contains an element g ∈ Z∗n such that |g| = r. Then he
seeks to find primes p and q in the forms p = 1+2r1x and q = 1+r2y, where
r1 and r2 are positive integers such that r = lcm(r1, r2), and x, y are taken
randomly. He checks the primality of p and q with some known primality
test. Then he finds elements g1 ∈ F
∗
p and g2 ∈ F
∗
q such that |g1| = r1 and
|g2| = r2, as above. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, he gets a solution
g of the set of equations g = g1(mod p), z = g2(modq). It follows that |g| = r.
Hence Bob can construct a couple g1, ..., gt of elements such that |gi| = ri,
for prescribed positive integers ri (i = 1, ..., t), and to construct a modular
ring Zn, n = pq, where p and q are different odd primes, that contains a
subgroup H ≤ Z∗n of prescribed exponent e(H) = e.
When Bob publics the field Fq, q = p
k, or modular ring Zn, n = pq, and
the subgroup H = gp(g1, ..., gt), constructed as above, he doesn’t public the
primality decompositions of p − 1 in the field case, and keeps secret the
factors of n in the modular ring case. In both cases the exponent e = e(H)
is private.
Oscar, an opponent, who wants to crack, modify, substitute, or replay
messages, cannot compute e without solving hard number theoretic primal-
ity factoring problem with respect to p− 1 in the field case. In the modular
ring case, he needs not only in knowing of the factors of n, but also he needs
in primality factorings of p − 1 and q − 1. Hence, in both the cases, the
exponent problem with respect to H can be considered as intractable.
2. Basic scheme of probabilistic subgroup-related encryption
founded on the intractability of EP.
Suppose two parties, say Alice and Bob, want to establish a secure trans-
port connection through a non-secure channel. They agree to use the mul-
tiplicative group K∗ as a platform, where K is a finite field Fq, q = p
k, or
a modular ring Zn, n = pq, where p and q are different sufficiently large
primes. Also they agree that Bob will choose all parameters and then he
will send all public parameters to Alice. The encryption by Alice, and the
decryption by Bob will be done as follows .
Field version.
(1) Bob creates a probabilistic cryptographic system. Namely, he chooses
a field Fq, q = p
k and two subgroups H and U of F∗q of coprime
orders r and s respectively. Elements of U encode all possible mes-
sages, and elements of H play role of masks. Also Bob computes
t = r−1(mod s).
(2) Bob sends the public parameters, namely: p, k,H,U , to Alice. The
subgroups H and U are specified by their generating elements, or by
some other effective method that does not reveal the secret param-
eters r and s.
(3) To transport a message u ∈ U, Alice chooses h ∈ H randomly, then
she sends g = hu to Bob through non-secure channel.
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(4) Bob receives g. Then he succeeds to reveal the message u as follows:
grt = (hr)t(urt) = u.
Remark 1.
• In particular, the subgroups H and U can be chosen such that F∗q =
HU. Then every element g ∈ F∗q can be uniquely written in the form
g = hu, where h ∈ H and u ∈ U.
• The orders |H| and |U | have to be sufficiently large. The presen-
tations of H and U should be chosen in a way that doesn’t give a
possibility to find the decomposition n = pq.
Modular ring version.
(1) Bob creates a probabilistic cryptographic system. Namely, he chooses
a modular ring Zn, n = pq, p and q different primes, and two sub-
groups H and U of Gn = Z
∗
n of coprime orders r and s respectively.
Elements of U encode all possible messages, and elements of H play
role of masks. Also Bob computes t = r−1(mod s).
(2) Bob sends the public parameters, namely: n,H,U , to Alice. The
subgroups H and U are specified by their generating elements, or by
some other effective method that does not reveal the secret param-
eters r and s.
(3) To transport a message u ∈ U, Alice chooses h ∈ H randomly, then
she sends g = hu to Bob through non-secure channel.
(4) Bob receives g. Then he succeeds to reveal the message as follows.
grt = (hr)t(urt) = u.
Remark 2.
• In particular, the subgroups H and U can be chosen such that F∗q =
HU. Then every element g ∈ F∗q can be uniquely written in the form
g = hu, where h ∈ H and u ∈ U.
• The orders |H| and |U | have to be sufficiently large. The presen-
tations of H and U should be chosen in a way that doesn’t give a
possibility to find the decomposition n = pq.
3. Some applications.
3.1. Probabilistic encryption based on RSA encryption. The follow-
ing encrypting has been proposed in [1] and [2]. The described above basic
scheme is combined with the standard RSA algorithm.
Let p and q be two different odd primes. Bob chooses subgroups H and
U of the multiplicative group Gn = Z
∗
n of the modular ring Zn such that
their respective orders t and r are coprime. He presents these subgroups by
their generating elements as: U = gp(u1, ..., um) and H = gp(h1, ..., hs), or
in a different effective way. We suppose that U is the message space, i.e.,
each message u is presented as an element of U , and vice versa. Now we fix
public and secret data that are established off-line as follows.
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Public data: n (and therefore Zn and Gn = Z
∗
n), u1, ..., um (and therefore
U), h1, ..., hs (and therefore H).
Secret data: p, q, ϕ(n) = (p− 1)(q − 1), r, t.
Alice chooses public key e ∈ Z such that gcd(e, r) = 1. Then she computes
the secret key d = td1 such that (te)d1 = 1(mod r). This is possible because
gcd(t, r) = gcd(e, r) = 1 by our assumption. Then ted = 1 + rk for some
integer k. Thus, Bob has the following keys:
Public key: e.
Secret key: d.
To send a message u ∈ U to Bob, the other party, Alice, chooses a random
element h ∈ H (secret session key) and acts as follows:
Encryption: u → c = (hu)e(mod n).
Bob recovers u as follows:
Decryption: c→ u = cd(modn).
Correctness: cd = (ht)ed1u(ur)k = u(mod n).
Security assumption. If the adversary can to find the factors p and q of n
he can not reveal message u without knowing of primality factorings of p−1
and q − 1. Hence, a security of the algorithm is based on intractability of
the full primality decomposition problem for positive integers. A priori, the
primality decomposition problem is harder than the decomposition problem
for positive integers of the form n = pq.
3.2. Probabilistic encryption based on the ElGamal key exchange
protocol. The ElGamal algorithm [4] is an asymmetric encryption algo-
rithm for public key cryptography, based on hardness of the Discrete loga-
rithm problem. ElGamal is semantically secure under reasonable assump-
tions, and is probabilistic [5]. The original ElGamal encryption scheme
[4] operates as follows. First, Bob fixes a large prime p, a generating ele-
ment g of the multiplicative group F∗p, and a positive integer a in the range
1 < a < p. Bob’s private key is taken to be a, while his public key is the
tuple (g, y = ga, p). Alice performs encryption by segmenting the plaintext
and encoding it as a sequence of integers in the range 0 < u < p. Alice
chooses a temporary secret in the form of an auxiliary random integer r
and encrypts a plaintext as c = u · yr = u · gar. Along with this encrypted
message c, Alice includes the header gr.
Bob performs decryption by first manipulating the header (gr)a = gar . It
follows that the original message can be recovered by noting that c·(gar)−1 =
u.
The ElGamal cipher leverages the purported difficulty of computing the
discrete logarithm.
We propose a new version of the ElGamal encryption that does not use
header. As the original, our version is probabilistic, but uses a very different
idea. This encryption scheme operates as follows. First, Bob chooses two
positive coprime integers r and s. Then he fixes a large prime p such that
p− 1 divides to rs, i.e., p− 1 = rsk for some k. He sets a = sk and b = rk.
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Bob’s private key is taken to be the tuple (r, s, a) while his public key is the
tuple (g, y = ga, gb, p).
He announces that the message space is subgroup gp(gb) which order is
s. Then he computes t = r−1(mod s).
Alice chooses a temporary secret in the form of an auxiliary random
integer l and encrypts a plaintext u = (gb)x = gbx as c = u · yl = u · gal.
Bob performs decryption by first manipulating cr = ur · (gal)r = ur ·
(grsk)l = ur · (gp−1)l = ur. It follows that the original message can be
recovered by noting that (ur)t = u.
Let u1, u2 ∈ gp(g
b) be two different messages, and ci = ui · g
al (i ∈ {0, 1}
be the cipher text of one of them. The Oscar, opponent, has to guess about
correct value of i. Suppose that he can give correct answer with probability
significantly greater than 1/2. As u−1j · ci lies in gp(g
a) if and only if i = j,
Oscar can to solve the membership problem for gp(ga) with probability
significantly greater than 1/2. Assuming the latter problem is hard when we
take elements from gp(ga)·gp(gb), we conclude that this version of ElGamal
encryption is semantically secure. Note that we can take a and b such that
gp(ga)·gp(gb) = F∗p.
3.3. Probabilistic encryption based on the Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change protocol. The Diffie-Hellman algorithm [6] is an asymmetric en-
cryption algorithm for public key cryptography, based on hardness of the
Discrete logarithm problem. The original Diffie-Hellman encryption scheme
[6] operates as follows. First, Alice and Bob agree upon a large prime p,
number q = pt and a generating element g of the multiplicative group F∗q.
Bob’s private key is taken to be a number b while his public key is gb. Alice’s
private key is a number a and her public key is ga. The secret key they ex-
change is then gab. Both users can compute this key. An unauthorized third
party will be unable to determine the key if it is computationally infeasible
to compute gab knowing only ga and gb.
We propose a new version of the Diffie-Hellman encryption that is prob-
abilistic. This encryption scheme operates as follows. First, Bob chooses
a private positive integer r, and Alice chooses a private positive integer s.
Then Bob takes randomly number x and publics r1 = rx. Alice takes ran-
domly y and publics s1 = sy. Then they agree upon prime of the form
p = 1 + 2r1s1z. They use field Fp as platform and agree upon some fixed
public element g ∈ F∗p. Ideally, g should be a generator of F
∗
p; however, this
is not absolutely necessary. Bob finds a subgroup H of F∗p of exponent r and
publics its generators; Alice finds a subgroup U of exponent s and publics
its generators.
To exchange secret key Bob chooses randomly private number b, element
u ∈ U, and Alice chooses randomly private number a and element h ∈ H.
Bob sends ugbr to Alice, Alice sends hgas to Bob.
Bob computes (hgas)rb = gabrs. Alice computes (ugbr)sa = gabrs, that is
the exchanged secret key.
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